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We describe incidence and risk factors for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus infection in healthcare personnel during 
the June–September 2009 epidemic in Singapore. Person-
nel contributed 3 serologic samples during June–October 
2009, with seroconversion deﬁ  ned as a >4-fold increase in 
hemagglutination inhibition titers to pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
Of 531 participants, 35 showed evidence of seroconversion. 
Seroconversion rates were highest in nurses (28/290) and 
lowest in allied health staff (2/116). Signiﬁ  cant risk factors 
on multivariate analysis were being a nurse (adjusted odds 
ratio [aOR] 4.5, 95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 1.0–19.6) and 
working in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards (aOR 
4.5, 95% CI 1.3–15.6). Contact with pandemic (H1N1) 
2009–infected colleagues (aOR 2.5, 95% CI 0.9–6.6) and 
larger household size (aOR 1.2, 95% CI 1.0–1.4) were of 
borderline signiﬁ  cance. Our study suggests that serocon-
version was associated with occupational and nonoccupa-
tional risk factors. 
D
uring the 2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), large nosocomial outbreaks of 
SARS occurred in several hospitals in Singapore (1,2). 
Since then, concerns have been raised about how emerg-
ing infections, in particular respiratory infections, could 
result in transmission from patients to healthcare workers 
and vice versa, given the high frequency and intensity of 
healthcare worker contacts in the hospital environment (3). 
For pandemic inﬂ  uenza, additional concerns exist that even 
mild disease might result in staff absenteeism and, subse-
quently, would reduce staff strength at a time of increased 
demand for health services (4).
In April 2009, a novel inﬂ  uenza A virus, now referred 
to as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, emerged in the United 
States and Mexico and rapidly spread worldwide (5–7). 
Published reports on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in health-
care workers have attributed transmission to a mixture of 
healthcare and nonhealthcare exposures (8–10), with vary-
ing compliance to infection control measures implicated in 
some transmission events (9,11). Early data from the United 
States suggest that healthcare workers were not overrepre-
sented among case reports of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 com-
pared with cases in the general population (9), but the risk 
for infection for healthcare workers, and between different 
subgroups of healthcare workers, remains unclear (9).
During the initial epidemic wave of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Singapore, June–September 2009, we conducted a 
prospective seroepidemiologic cohort study among health-
care workers in Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH), Singapore, 
by using serial blood specimens to determine antibody levels 
against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 as a marker of serologic in-
fection. We describe the incidence of serologic evidence of 
infection and associated occupational and nonoccupational 
risk factors for infection in this cohort of healthcare workers.
Methods
Study Setting
TTSH is an acute-care hospital in Singapore with 
1,100 beds and ≈6,000 healthcare workers; it has a desig-
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nated center, the Communicable Disease Centre, for man-
agement of outbreaks of emerging infections. Following 
the activation of Singapore’s pandemic response plan by 
the Ministry of Health on April 25, 2009, TTSH became 
the designated screening center and isolation facility for all 
adult case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009, although 
the ﬁ  rst case-patient with the infection in Singapore did not 
receive a diagnosis and was not admitted to the hospital 
until May 26, 2009 (12). Intensive surveillance and test-
ing of staff who had acute respiratory illness (ARI) symp-
toms conﬁ  rmed the ﬁ  rst case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in a TTSH staff member 4 weeks later, on June 22, 2009, 
several days after sustained community transmission had 
occurred in Singapore (13,14).
Study Design
This study was part of a larger seroepidemiologic in-
vestigation involving 3 other cohorts in Singapore: com-
munity-dwelling adults, military personnel, and staff and 
residents of 2 long-term care facilities (15). In TTSH health-
care workers (as well as in the community-dwelling adults 
and military personnel), up to 3 serial serum samples were 
taken from each person. The samples included 1) a baseline 
sample collected during June 22–July 7, 2009, before wide-
spread local transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009; 2) an 
intraepidemic follow-up sample, collected during August 
19–September 3, 2009, ≈4 weeks after pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 epidemic activity had peaked in Singapore; and 3) a 
postepidemic follow-up sample, collected during Septem-
ber 29–October 15, 2009, >4 weeks after epidemic activity 
subsided in late August 2009 (14). 
In addition, we used standardized self-administered 
questionnaires to obtain baseline demographic informa-
tion, seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccination status, and household 
composition data at the time of baseline sample collection. 
Symptoms and possible exposures in the intervening pe-
riods between samples were elicited through follow-up 
questionnaires administered at the time the intraepidemic 
and postepidemic samples were taken. Symptom reviews 
covered episodes of ARI, deﬁ  ned as a new onset illness 
with any respiratory symptoms (rhinorrhea, nasal conges-
tion, sore throat, or cough), with febrile respiratory illness 
(FRI) being an ARI episode with self-reported fever or a 
body temperature (where available) >37.5°C. Information 
on symptomatic episodes was augmented through sickness 
absenteeism rates and staff medical records for details such 
as dates of illness and tests to conﬁ  rm pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection. Exposure data covered nonoccupational 
exposures such as travel out of Singapore and episodes of 
ARI and FRI in household members, as well as occupa-
tional exposures such as care of patients with conﬁ  rmed 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection and contact with sick 
colleagues who have subsequently conﬁ  rmed  pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. Healthcare workers were also asked, when 
appropriate, how often they used either a surgical mask 
or N95 respirator during patient care and to estimate their 
average daily number of visitor and patient contacts.  The 
number of colleagues in the same work area was used as a 
proxy indicator of the number of staff-to-staff contacts. 
Recruitment of Study Participants
For the purposes of our study, we deﬁ  ned healthcare 
workers as any full-time staff personnel employed by 
TTSH, regardless of the nature of their work. We used in-
ternal hospital email systems and word-of-mouth referrals 
to invite all personnel >21 years of age to participate. In 
addition, mobile teams were sent to appropriate hospital 
locations such as wards, outpatient clinics, and other major 
work areas, such as operating theater, radiology, labora-
tory medicine, pharmacy, physiotherapy, and occupational 
therapy departments. Included in these were 3 postulated 
high-exposure settings: the designated isolation wards for 
patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009, the emergency de-
partment through which patients with pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 were being admitted, and the medical intensive care 
and high-dependency units where patients with the most 
severe pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infections were treated. 
Healthcare workers with ARI episodes that occurred within 
the 2 weeks before baseline samples were obtained were 
excluded, given that enrollment stopped 2 weeks after the 
ﬁ  rst TTSH staff member received a diagnosis of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. Written informed consent was obtained for 
all participants. The study was approved by the ethics re-
view boards of the National Healthcare Group.
Laboratory Methods and Computation 
of Geometric Mean Titer 
Samples were tested by hemagglutination inhibition 
(HI) assays following standard protocols at the World 
Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Reference 
and Research on Inﬂ  uenza in Melbourne, Australia (16). 
Serum samples were pretreated with receptor-destroying 
enzyme II (Deka Seiken Co. Ltd., Tokyo, Japan), 1:4 (vol/
vol), at 37°C for 16 h before enzyme inactivation by the ad-
dition of an equal volume of 1.6% trisodium citrate (Ajax 
Chemicals, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia) and incuba-
tion at 56°C for 30 min. A/California/7/2009 A(H1N1) 
pandemic virus was puriﬁ  ed on a sucrose gradient, con-
centrated, and inactivated with β-propiolactone, to create 
an inﬂ  uenza zonal pool preparation. Twenty-ﬁ  ve microli-
ters (4 hemagglutination units) of inﬂ  uenza zonal pool A/
California/7/2009 virus were incubated at room tempera-
ture with an equal volume of receptor-destroying enzyme 
II–treated serum samples, with different wells for serum 
titrated in 2-fold dilutions from 1:10 to 1:1,280 in phos-
phate-buffered saline. After incubation of serum for 1 h, 
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25 μL of 1% (vol/vol) turkey erythrocytes was added to 
each well. HI was read after 30 min, with titers expressed 
as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum in which 
hemagglutination was prevented. For computing geometric 
mean titers (GMTs), we assigned titers <10 a value of 5, 
and titers ≥1,280 a value of 1,280. These values were then 
log transformed before we computed means and associated 
95% conﬁ  dence intervals (CIs). GMTs were then obtained 
by back transformation (17).
The HI assay was assessed on paired serum samples 
from 56 case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 con-
ﬁ   rmed by reverse transcription–PCR. The assay had a 
sensitivity of 80% when seroconversion was deﬁ  ned as a 
≥4-fold increase in antibody titers between the ﬁ  rst and sec-
ond blood specimens (15).
Sample Size Calculations and Outcomes of Interest
We targeted a ﬁ  nal sample size of at least 500, which 
would have given a power of 90% to detect (with a 2-sided 
p<0.05) seroconversion rates that were 10% higher for the 
healthcare workers cohort than the concurrently taken com-
munity sample, which was assumed would have serocon-
version rates of 25% (on the basis of the 1957 pandemic) 
(18). The target sample size would also have given a power 
of >70% to detect a ≥2× risk of seroconversion in a health-
care worker subgroup of ≈100 than in the rest of the health-
care worker population, assuming overall seroconversion 
risk in healthcare workers exceeded 10%.
The primary outcome of interest was seroconversion, 
which was deﬁ  ned as a ≥4-fold increase in antibody titers 
between any successive pair of blood specimens. We per-
formed univariate and multivariate logistic regression with 
demographic information, seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine sta-
tus, titers in the baseline sample, occupational and nonoc-
cupational related exposures to assess their contribution to 
seroconversion, with results presented as odds ratios (ORs) 
with asymptotic Wald 95% CI and 2-sided p values. Mul-
tivariate analysis involved backward stepwise logistic re-
gression with all variables signiﬁ  cant at p<0.10; only vari-
ables which improved model ﬁ  t at p<0.10 were included in 
the ﬁ  nal model. Where appropriate, 95% CIs were also pre-
sented, along with χ2 and Student unpaired t test results for 
differences between proportions and means, respectively. 
All statistical analyses were performed by using STATA 
10.0 (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA).
Results
We enrolled a total of 558 healthcare workers into the 
study, of which 96% (537/558) had ≥1 follow-up blood 
sample; 6 participants were excluded because of miss-
ing follow-up review questionnaires, leaving 531 persons 
for analysis. Of these, 35 (6.6%) seroconverted. Table 1 
compares selected characteristics of seroconverters and 
nonseroconverters. Seroconverters were sampled earlier 
than nonseroconverters (49% vs. 38% in the ﬁ  rst week of 
enrollment), and 86% of seroconverters had both follow-
up samples compared with 81% of nonseroconverters, but 
these differences were not signiﬁ  cant (p = 0.20 and p = 
0.73, respectively). Seroconverters were slightly more like-
ly to have received seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine than were 
nonseroconverters (97% vs. 91%), but this difference was 
not signiﬁ  cant. There were no also signiﬁ  cant differences 
between seroconverters and nonseroconverters by age or 
gender. HI titers in baseline samples from nonseroconvert-
ers were higher than in baseline samples from seroconvert-
ers (GMT 7.8 vs. 5.9; p = 0.02). Among seroconverters, 
63% and 51% reported having an ARI and FRI episode, 
respectively, and only 15% and 8% of nonseroconvert-
ers reported having an ARI and FRI episode, respectively 
(p<0.01 for both).
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Table 1. Selected characteristics of healthcare workers by seroconversion status for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Singapore, 2009* 
Characteristic No. (%) seroconverters, n = 35  No. (%) nonseroconverters, n = 496  p value 
Baseline sample timing  0.20† 
  Jun 22–26   17 (49)  187 (38) 
  Jun 28–Jul 7  18 (51)  309 (62) 
Follow-up samples taken  0.73† 
   Intraepidemic only  3 (9)  65 (13) 
   Postepidemic only  2 (6)  31 (6) 
  Intraepidemic and postepidemic   30 (86)  400 (81) 
Female   30 (86)  411 (83)  0.66† 
Seasonal influenza vaccination  34 (97)  449 (91)  0.19† 
ARI episode‡  22 (63)  75 (15)  <0.01† 
FRI episode‡  18 (51)  41 (8)  <0.01† 
Age,  y, mean (95% CI)  35 (31–39)  34 (33–35)  0.76§ 
GMT for baseline sample (95% CI)  5.9 (5.3–6.5)  7.8 (7.3–8.3)  0.02§ 
*ARI, acute respiratory illness; FRI, febrile respiratory illness; CI, confidence interval; GMT, geometric mean titer. 
†F
2 test comparing seroconverters and nonseroconverters. 
‡Healthcare workers who seroconverted are considered to have had an ARI or FRI episode if the date of onset preseded the date when seroconversion 
was detected. 
§Student t test comparing seroconverters and nonseroconverters. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Seroconversion, Singapore
Most of our participants were nurses (290/531, 55%; 
Table 2); allied health staff, which included mostly par-
ticipants from paramedical professions such as pharma-
cists, laboratory medicine technicians, physiotherapists 
and occupational therapists, formed the second largest 
group (116/531, 22%); ancillary and support staff, which 
included mainly hospital attendants and patient service 
associates, formed the next largest group (69/531, 13%); 
and administrative support staff (35/531, 7%) and doctors 
(21/531, 4%) made up the rest. Seroconversion rates were 
highest in nurses (28/290, 10%) and lowest in allied health 
staff (2/116, 2%). To facilitate interpretation, allied health 
staff were designated the reference group for computing 
ORs; only nurses had a signiﬁ  cantly higher odds of infec-
tion compared with allied health staff (OR 6.1, 95% CI 
1.4–26.0; p = 0.02). Compared with those working in non–
patient care areas, participants whose primary work area 
was an inpatient ward had higher odds for seroconversion 
(OR 1.4, 95% CI 0.5–3.5; p = 0.54), while those in other 
patient care settings had lower odds for seroconversion 
(OR 0.5, 95% CI 0.2–1.5; p = 0.21), but neither result was 
signiﬁ  cant. Signiﬁ  cantly higher odds for seroconversion 
were also observed for participants whose primary work 
area was in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards (OR 
4.8, 95% CI 1.5–15.6; p<0.01).
Participants who had contact with patients who had 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had marginally but not signiﬁ  -
cantly increased odds of seroconversion (OR 1.8, 95% CI 
0.9–3.7; p = 0.10). Those who reported having contact 
with a sick colleague(s) whose illness was subsequently 
diagnosed as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had signiﬁ  cantly in-
creased odds of seroconversion (OR 2.9, 95% CI 1.2–6.9; 
p = 0.02).
Results of the univariate analysis for nonoccupational 
exposures are presented in the Figure. Healthcare workers 
from larger households had increased odds of seroconver-
sion (OR 1.2 per additional household member, 95% CI 
1.0–1.4; p = 0.04), but no discernible association was seen 
between seroconversion and having another healthcare 
worker in the same household or reporting another house-
hold member with ARI or FRI symptoms during the study. 
However, having a child or adolescent in the household 
increased the odds of seroconversion. In particular, signiﬁ  -
cantly higher ORs were observed if the healthcare workers 
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Table 2. Univariate analysis of occupational risk factors for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 for 531 healthcare workers, Singapore, 2009*
Risk factor  No. participants No. (%) seroconverted   Crude OR (95% CI)  p value 
Occupational subgroup 
  Allied health  116 2 (2)  Referent 
  Nurses  290 28 (10)  6.1 (1.4–26.0)  0.02
  Ancilllary and support  69 2 (3)  1.7 (0.2–12.4)  0.60
  Administration  35 2 (6)  3.5 (0.5–25.5)  0.22
  Doctors  21 1 (5)  2.9 (0.2–32.9)  0.40
Direct patient contact 
 No  71 4  (6)  Referent 
  Yes  460 31 (7)  1.2 (0.4–3.5)  0.73
Primary work area 
  Nonpatient care areas  83 6 (7)  Referent 
  Inpatient wards  210 20 (10)  1.4 (0.5–3.5)  0.54
  Other patient care settings†  238 9 (4)  0.5 (0.2–1.5)  0.21
Work in high exposure settings 
  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards  514 31 (6)  Referent 
  No  514 31  (6)  Referent 
  Yes  17 4  (24)  4.8  (1.5–15.6)  <0.01
 Emergency  department  507 33  (7)  Referent 
  No  507 33  (7)  Referent 
  Yes  24 2  (8)  1.3  (0.3–5.8)  0.73
 Medical  ICU/HDU 
  No  514 33  (6)  Referent 
  Yes  17 2  (12)  1.9  (0.4–8.9)  0.39
Contact with patient who had pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 
 No  409 23  (6)  Referent 
  Yes  122 12 (10)  1.8 (0.9–3.8)  0.10
Contact with sick colleague(s) who had pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
 No  484 28 (6)  Referent 
 Yes  47 7 (15)  2.9 (1.2–6.9)  0.02
*OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; ICU, intensive care unit, HDU, high-dependency unit.  
†Includes allied health and medical staff from departments with both inpatient and outpatient coverage and staff from all other noninpatient departments 
involved in patient care.  RESEARCH
reported a child 5–12 years of age in the household (OR 
2.1, 95% CI 1.0–4.4; p = 0.05), with the ORs being even 
higher if a child 5–12 years of age in the household had FRI 
symptoms (OR 4.1, 95% CI 1.1–15.6; p = 0.04).
The variables included in the ﬁ  nal multivariate analysis 
are shown in Table 3. Being a nurse remained signiﬁ  cantly 
associated with increased odds of infection (OR 4.5, 95% 
CI 1.0–19.6; p = 0.05), as did having pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 isolation wards as a primary work area (OR 4.5, 95% 
CI 1.3–15.6; p = 0.02). Contact with colleagues with pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 (OR 2.5, 95% CI 0.9–6.6; p = 0.06) 
and coming from a larger household (OR 1.2 per additional 
household member, 95% CI 1.0–1.4; p = 0.06) were of bor-
derline signiﬁ  cance. Having higher HI titers in the baseline 
serum sample was protective (OR 0.5 per unit of increase, 
95% CI 0.3–1.0; p = 0.05).
In Table 4, allied health participants are compared 
with nurses, the groups with the lowest and highest se-
roconversion rates respectively; the latter was further 
stratiﬁ   ed by whether they worked in inpatient wards 
(ward based vs. non–ward based). The proportion who se-
roconverted was slightly, but not signiﬁ  cantly, higher in 
ward-based nurses than in non–ward-based nurses (11% 
vs. 8%; p = 0.53). Ward-based nurses were from signiﬁ  -
cantly larger households than the other 2 groups (p<0.01 
vs. allied health, p = 0.01 vs. non–ward-based nurses). No 
signiﬁ  cant difference was found in the proportion who re-
ported using face masks all or almost all of the time in pa-
tient care, but ward-based nurses were signiﬁ  cantly more 
likely to have had seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine than were al-
lied health workers (p<0.01). Key differences were found 
in the mean number of contacts and occupational related 
factors. Non–ward-based nurses mostly worked in large 
areas, including operating theaters, the emergency depart-
ment, and outpatient clinics, and hence had signiﬁ  cantly 
higher numbers of contacts than either ward-based nurses 
or allied health workers (p<0.01 on all measures). On the 
other hand, ward-based nurses were signiﬁ  cantly more 
likely to be in contact with patients with conﬁ  rmed pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 (p<0.01 vs. non–ward-based and al-
lied health), and allied health staff were signiﬁ  cantly less 
likely to be in contact with a sick colleague who had pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 (p<0.01 vs. either nursing group).
Discussion
In this study, we used paired serum samples to assess 
infection rates and risk factors for infection in healthcare 
personnel during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic in an acute care 
hospital in Singapore. We observed surprisingly lower 
seroconversion rates in healthcare personnel than in the 
rest of the community, as was emphasized in another pub-
lication (15), and found that a mixture of occupational and 
nonoccupational exposures were associated with risk for   
infection.
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Figure. Univariate analysis for nonoccupational exposures to 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among healthcare workers, Singapore. 
Error bars indicate 95% conﬁ  dence intervals (CIs) for odds ratios 
(ORs). †n/N, no. of seroconverters/no. in strata. HH, household;   
HCP, healthcare provider; HHM, household member; ARI, acute 
respiratory illness; FRI, febrile respiratory illness.
Table 3. Multivariate analysis of risk factors associated with seroconversion for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 531 healthcare workers,
Singapore, 2009* 
Risk factor  Adjusted OR (95% CI)  p value 
Occupational subgroup 
 Allied  health  Referent 
 Nurses  4.5 (1.0–19.6)  0.05
  Ancilllary and support  1.5 (0.2–11.1)  0.69
 Administration  3.6 (0.3–42.8)  0.31
 Doctors  3.8 (0.5–28.7)  0.19
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards vs. all others  4.5 (1.3–15.6)  0.02
Contact with colleague(s) who had pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vs. none  2.5 (0.9–6.6)  0.06
Household size (per additional household member)  1.2 (1.0–1.4)  0.06
HI titer in baseline sample (per unit of increase)†  0.5 (0.3–1.0)  0.05
*OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; HI, hemagglutination inhibition.  
†For every unit increase in baseline (sample A) titer, where the integer values of 0–8 denote titers <0, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640, and >1,280, 
respectively. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Seroconversion, Singapore
When the study was planned, we had expected the 
healthcare workers cohort to have a higher seroincidence 
than a group of community-dwelling adults, given previous 
reports of pandemic and nonpandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreaks 
in hospitals (19,20), our own experience with SARS (1), and 
recent work showing the intensity of work-related contacts 
in the healthcare setting (3). Instead, we found that only 
7% of our healthcare workers seroconverted, compared 
with 13% of participants in the community cohort (15). Our 
study corroborates case-reporting data in the United States, 
which suggest that healthcare workers did not have a higher 
incidence of infection than the general community, without 
being subject to biases that might arise from underreporting 
or differential case ascertainment (9). 
Although deﬁ   nitively attributing the low infection 
rates in healthcare workers to improved infection con-
trol practices is difﬁ   cult without the appropriate con-
trol groups, much evidence supports the efﬁ  cacy of the 
common bundle of measures used in hospitals to reduce 
spread of respiratory viruses (21). Notably, there was a 
high level of preparedness and widespread implementa-
tion of airborne and respiratory droplet precautions and 
other pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection control practices 
in healthcare institutions in the United States, Singapore, 
and elsewhere (11,13,22–24).
However, our study also suggests that the risk to 
healthcare staff should not be underestimated. We found 
some occupational factors associated with seroconversion. 
The higher seroconversion rates in nurses posted to des-
ignated pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards should be 
interpreted with some caution in view of the small number 
of seroconversion events (2 of those infected had symp-
toms and 2 did not) and participants (n = 17) from these 
wards. Since masks (either surgical or N95 masks) were 
widely used in all clinical areas around the hospital, this 
group essentially had the same level of protection as other 
staff while being far more intensely exposed to pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. The higher risk for seroconversion for nurses 
on multivariate analysis also deserves notice. Nurses had 
higher seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccination rates and were more 
compliant than other occupational subgroups in following 
preventive measures such as mask use. However, they also 
were more likely to be exposed to patients as well as to 
have colleagues with conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009; 
the latter factor was signiﬁ  cantly associated with serocon-
version by univariate analysis (and of borderline signiﬁ  -
cance on multivariate analysis), and staff-to-staff transmis-
sion was also implicated in TTSH and elsewhere (10,13). 
Non–ward-based nurses also had higher contact rates than 
the other main occupational subgroup (allied health staff), 
a factor that we could not account for in multivariate anal-
ysis (as questions on contact rates were not answered by 
all participants). We also could not account for the nature 
of patient contacts, which might be more prolonged and 
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Table 4. Comparison of risk factors among allied health staff, ward-based nurses, and non–ward-based nurses for exposures to 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, mask use, and work-related contacts, Singapore, 2009* 
Risk factor 
1: Allied health 
staff, n = 116
2: Non–ward-based 
nurses, n = 103
3: Ward-based 
nurses, n = 187
p values†
2 vs. 1 3 vs. 1 3 vs. 2
Seroconverted in study period, % 2 (0–6) 8 (4–15) 11 (7–16) 0.05 <0.01 0.53
Mean age, y 32 (30–33) 34 (32–36) 32 (31–34) 0.14 0.81 0.21
Mean household size 4.8 (4.4–5.1) 4.8 (4.4–5.2) 5.5 (5.1–5.8) 0.96 <0.01 0.01
Household members with FRI in the following age groups, % 
  0– 4 y 3 (1–7) 3 (1–8) 2 (1–5) 1.00 1.00 0.70
 5–12  y 2 (0–6) 4 (2–10) 1 (0–4) 0.42 0.64 0.19
 13–19  y 1 (0–5) 3 (1–8) 2 (1–5) 0.34 0.65 0.70
Masks for patient care all or almost all the time, % 64 (53–74) 71 (59–80) 69 (61–77) 0.48 0.54 0.87
 Valid  responses‡ 76 69 130
Received seasonal influenza vaccine, % 84 (77–90) 91 (84–95) 96 (92–98) 0.15 <0.01 0.19
Geometric mean no. colleagues in work area 27 (24–31) 48 (39–59) 23 (20–25) <0.01 0.05 <0.01
 Valid  responses‡ 101 89 147
Geometric mean no. patient contacts per day 15 (12–18) 37 (26–52) 19 (17–22) <0.01 0.03 <0.01
 Valid  responses‡ 73 59 127
Geometric mean no. visitor contacts per day 12 (9–15) 28 (21–38) 15 (13–18) <0.01 0.04 <0.01
 Valid  responses‡ 75 58 133
Occupational-related exposures, %
  Direct patient contact 84 (77–90) 91 (84–95) 99 (97–100) 0.15 <0.01 <0.01
  Contact with patients who had pandemic 
 (H1N1)  2009
14 (9–21) 19 (13–28) 41 (34–48) 0.28 <0.01 <0.01
  Contact with colleague(s) who had  
  pandemic (H1N1) 2009
2 (0–6) 15 (9–23) 14 (10–20) <0.01 <0.01 0.86
*Values in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. FRI, febrile respiratory illness. 
†p values by Fisher exact test for proportions and unpaired Student t test for means. 
‡Based on participants who answered this questionnaire item; all other analyses are based on no. participants in that occupational subgroup. RESEARCH
intense in nurses (3). We suggest that our ﬁ  nding of the 
higher seroconversion risk in nurses is the result of residual 
confounding by the sum of these factors, many of which 
are an integral part of the nursing profession.
Lastly, our study suggests that nonoccupational expo-
sures should not be forgotten as a potential source of health-
care worker infections. Other studies based on case investi-
gations have also attributed some infections to community 
sources, and in our study, we found that having a child of 
primary school age was a risk factor on univariate analysis, 
particularly if that child had an FRI during the study period, 
although the direction of transmission in the latter could 
not be ascertained. Studies on nonpandemic inﬂ  uenza have 
found that index cases from pediatric age groups were 
more likely to generate secondary cases (25,26), although 
the same was not observed with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(27). The effect of having children in the household was 
superseded in multivariate analysis by overall household 
size, which was unsurprising since households with chil-
dren also tended to be larger. In any case, the signiﬁ  cance 
of such nonoccupational exposures should be taken into ac-
count in any hospital-level pandemic preparedness plan.
We do acknowledge several limitations in our study. 
First, our ﬁ  ndings are based on data from healthcare work-
ers from just 1 hospital. Moreover, the unexpectedly low 
seroconversion rates in our cohort reduced the power of the 
study to investigate exposures more weakly associated with 
the outcome. We were also unable to assess the usefulness 
of personal protective equipment due to the lack of appro-
priate control groups. The resolution of exposure data from 
what was a self-administered questionnaire survey was also 
lower than insights that may be gained from detailed case 
investigations or exposure diaries that have been used in 
the healthcare setting (3,11). Finally, the lack of random-
ization also leaves scope for bias in our results.
An effective vaccine for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has 
now been introduced, and this will likely reduce intrahos-
pital risk of infection from this particular strain of inﬂ  uenza 
until signiﬁ  cant genetic drift occurs, provided healthcare 
institutions can overcome the challenges to achieving high 
vaccine coverage rates in healthcare personnel (28,29). Sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza vaccination rates may be atypically high in 
TTSH because of its designated status as a ﬁ  rst-line screen-
ing and referral center; 1 study on healthcare workers from 
2 other hospitals in Singapore found that only 39% of par-
ticipants were vaccinated (30). Although the low incidence 
of healthcare workers infections provides some suggestion 
that measures in place during the pandemic were effective, 
our ﬁ  ndings suggest that some occupation-related risk fac-
tors remain. Nurses, particularly those working in pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards, were disproportionately 
affected, possibly because their higher levels of protective 
behaviors inadequately compensated for their increased oc-
cupational risk. This situation should be recognized when 
planning for future pandemics.
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